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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ness to erode the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, even in a case
in which the action was clearly inexcusable and unfounded. This reaf-
firmation of the doctrine leads to two conclusions. First, it lends new
impetus to the calls for extending only qualified immunity to judges in
section 1983 cases 38 and to the suggestions that governmental units
should be held liable for the constitutional violations of their employ-
ees.-" Second, the decision precludes the possibility that the Court will
apply qualified immunity to the judiciary.40 Congressional action to
apply qualified immunity to judges or to hold governmental units lia-
ble, or both,4' is necessary to make section 1983 a viable remedy for
persons injured by a judge's actions.
TORTS-COMMON LAW LIABILITY-SOCIAL HOST MAY BE LIABLE
TO THIRD PARTIES. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d
669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978). An automobile passenger brought an
action for damages against the owner and the manager of an apartment
complex who allegedly furnished intoxicating liquors to the driver of
the automobile in which plaintiff was riding. He claimed that the
driver's resulting intoxication caused the car's collision with a roadway
abutment and his consequent injuries. Plaintiff further alleged that de-
fendants knew or should have known that their guest was becoming
excessively intoxicated and intended to operate a motor vehicle follow-
38. See general' Kates, supra note 18; Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1202-04;
Note, Immumiti of Federal and State Judges from Civil Suit-Time for a Qualfied Immunit,?, 27
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 727 (1977); Note, supra note 18.
39. See generaly Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability 77 COLUlM.
L, REV. 1175 (1977). Holding the governmental unit liable for the judge's unconstitutional action
would provide a remedy for the injured plaintiff, would allocate the cost to the general public,
which benefits from the judge's employment, and, to the extent that state judges are a part of the
political process, would deter unconstitutional actions.
40. Id. See Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2916 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
discusing the disparate treatment ofjudges and prosecutors, who receive absolute immunity, and
other state officials, who receive only qualified immunity, Justice Rehnquist observed: "But the
cynical among us might not unreasonably feel that this is simply another unfortunate example of
judges treating those who are not part of the judicial machinery as 'lesser breeds without the
law."'" Id. at 2922 n*.
41. The fine line between promoting independent decisionmaking and deterring malicious or
unconstitutional action may best be drawn by providing for liability of the governmental unit, but
allowing the good faith and reasonable belief defense of qualified immunity.
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
294 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1979:281
ing her consumption of the liquor. The trial court sustained the de-
fendants' demurrers, and the passenger sought mandamus.' The
California Supreme Court issued the writ and held- Under both com-
mon law and the California Business and Professions Code,2 a social
host who furnishes intoxicating liquor to "an obviously intoxicated"
guest may be liable for harm to third parties when the risk of injury to
others is reasonably foreseeable.3
The common law imposes liability upon a person for foreseeable in-
juries proximately caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care for
the protection of others.4 A purveyor of intoxicating liquors tradition-
ally was not liable in tort for injury to the person or property of another
caused by his patron or guest.5 The rationale for the rule was that the
proximate cause of the injury was not the furnishing of the alcoholic
beverages, but rather their consumption by the purchaser or donee.6
Legislatures in many states modified this rule by the enactment of
"dram shop" acts, which created a cause of action in injured third par-
ties against persons who illegally sold or furnished intoxicating li-
quors.7 Other states established criminal sanctions for the sale or gift of
intoxicating liquors to designated classes of persons, such as minors or
visibly intoxicated persons. 8 Courts employed these two kinds of enact-
ments to extend the civil liability of both commercial and noncommer-
I. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 147-48, 577 P.2d 669, 670-71, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534, 537-38 (1978).
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (Deering 1976). "Every person who sells, furnishes,
gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or
common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor."
3. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
5. E.g., Howlett v. Doglio, 402 IlL. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949); Joyce v, Hatfield, 197 Md.
249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951); Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966); Tarwater v. Atlantic
Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746 (1940); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939). See
general, H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS REGULATING MANUFACTURE AND SALE OF IN-
TOXICATING LIQUORS § 281 (1892).
6. E.g., King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505 (1886); Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125
(1945); Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967).
7. Approximately fifteen states presently have dram shop acts. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 6,
§ 6-5-71 (1975); N.Y. GEN. OaLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4399.01 (Page 1973).
8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.50 (West 1962); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 138, § 69
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.310 (Vernon 1963). For a thorough discussion
of the history of dram shop legislation, see Hagglund & Arthur, Common Law Liquor Liability 7
FORUM 73 (1971).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/29
Number 1] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
cial dispensers of alcoholic beverages to third parties.9
Dram shop acts initially applied only to commercial purveyors of
alcoholic beverages.' 0 Some courts, however, have recently inter-
preted the language of acts that impose civil liability on "any person"
illegally "selling, bartering, or giving"" alcoholic beverages to include
social hosts, '2 despite the arguments that legislatures intended "giving"
to include only those "gifts" that were merely a "subterfuge for sale"' 3
and that the title of the acts should limit their application to those in
the liquor business.' 4
Liquor control statutes with criminal sanctions also provided a vehi-
cle for judicial extension of tort liability. Violation of statutory
prohibitions may be negligence per se, or evidence of negligence, if the
injured party falls within the class of persons the legislature intended to
protect and if the harm that occurs is one the statute was designed to
prevent."' In addition to finding a violation of the penal statute, a court
must also find that the sale or gift of liquor proximately caused the
injury.' 6 Several courts have held owners and operators of taverns
civilly liable on these grounds,' 7 and a few have even applied such rea-
9. Actions allowed against a tavern owner for injuries sustained by the consumer himself
are not treated in this casenote. For examples of such actions, see Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15
(3d Cir. 1961) (automobile accident); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965) (piece
of glass embedded in wrist when patron pounded fist on table); Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, 46
N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966) (fatal fall in tavern); Smith v. Evans, 421 Pa. 247, 219 A.2d 310
(1966) (automobile accident); Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965) (fell or
jumped from ledge onto roof of hotel kitchen); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. Ct. 341, 146
A.2d 648 (1958) (struck by another customer when plaintiff attempted to pin a flower on him).
10. See e.g., Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass
Co., 48 111. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964).
11. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972) (amended 1977):
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured in
person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, has a right of action,
in his own name, against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxi-
cating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained; and all
damages recovered by a minor under this section shall be paid either to such minor or to
his parent, guardian, or next friend, as the court directs; and all suits for damages under
this section shall be by civil action in any court of this state having jurisdiction thereof.
12. See. e.g., Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972); Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn.
115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972). See generallh 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 709 (1973); 1973 WASH. U.L.Q.
708.
13. See Harris v. Hardesty, Il1 Kan. 291, 296, 207 P. 188, 190 (1922).
14. See Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 236, 20 N.E. 73, 75 (1889).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at § 42.
17. See. e.g., Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Adamian v. Three Sons,
Inc.. 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 u1968); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618
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soning to private individuals. 8
Because it had no dram shop act, California relied on its liquor con-
trol statutes t9 to render those who serve liquor liable to third parties
who are injured by the intoxicated person. Citing the staggering
number of alcohol-related automobile accidents, the California
Supreme Court in Vesely v. Sager"° overruled prior decisions, 21 and
held that civil liability could be imposed on a vendor of intoxicating
liquors even though the patron's consumption intervened between the
sale and the injury to the third party.22 The duty to the plaintiff injured
by the inebriated patron arose from a statute that prohibits the furnish-
ing of liquor to obviously intoxicated persons; the purpose of the stat-
ute is to protect the general public from injury resulting from excessive
use of alcoholic beverages.23 The court ruled that the vendor's sale met
the proximate cause requirement because the sale was a substantial fac-
tor in causing the injury and because the consumptive act of the patron
was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the negligent sale.24 A year
later the California Court of Appeal in Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor
Co. 25 applied Vesely to a parallel section of the liquor control statute,
which prohibited the sale of liquor to minors.26 Construing the words
"every person" to encompass both commercial and noncommercial
(1973); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No.
1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964). But see, e.g., Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656
(1965); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc.,
85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966); Hulse v.
Driver, 11 Wash. App. 509, 524 P.2d 255 (1974).
18. See Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 634, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974); Thaut v. Finley, 50
Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973).
19. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602, 25658 (Deering 1976). Section 25658(a) provides:
"Every person who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alco-
holic beverage to any person under the age of 21 years is guilty of a misdemeanor." For the text of
§ 25602, see note 1 supra.
20. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
21. The court overruled the following cases: Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450
(1955); Lammers v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 186 Cal. 379, 199 P. 523 (1921); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943).
22. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 165, 486 P.2d 151, 160, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631-32 (1971).
See 5 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 441 (1972); 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 645.
23. 5 Cal. 3d at 165, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
24. Id.
25. 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972) (employer liability for accident caused by
intoxicated minor employee after leaving office Christmas party).
26. For the text of the pertinent section, see note 19 supra.
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purveyors, a7 the court held a social host liable for injuries to a third
party.2 %
Both Fesely and Brockett expressly left open the issue whether a
noncommercial supplier could be subject to civil liability to third par-
ties for providing alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated per-
son.2 9 Coulter v. Superior Court30 resolved this question by adopting
the Court of Appeal's construction of "every person" in its interpreta-
tion of section 25602.3  The court, however, went a step further and
held that damage suits against a social purveyor may be maintained on
the basis of "established general negligence principles" wholly apart
from the liquor control statute.3 2 The existence of the host's common
law duty rests on the foreseeability of harm to third persons on the
highway, the certainty of plaintiff's injuries, the close connection be-
tween the host's conduct and the injury suffered, and the strong public
policy that seeks to prevent future alcohol-related accidents."
While the decision in Coulter seems far-reaching, at least in terms of
popular perceptions of appropriate conduct, it is actually only a short
step from Vesely. Once Vesehl, removed the traditional proximate
cause bar to the maintenance of a negligence action,34 the California
court needed only to establish the existence of a supplier's duty to third
parties injured by the inebriate.3" The liquor control laws provided a
statutory basis from which to infer this duty. After Brockett and Coul-
ter extended this duty to noncommercial as well as commercial provid-
ers of alcoholic beverages, the finding of a common law duty was
virtually inevitable. 36 In light of the deadly combination of
automobiles and intoxicated drivers, 37 the California Supreme Court
justifiably found that service of liquor to an obviously intoxicated guest
is a breach of the supplier's duty of due care.
27. 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752, 756 (1972).
28. Id.
29. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 157, 486 P.2d 151, 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 625 (1971);
Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752, 756 (1972).
30. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
31. Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
32. Id. at 149, 577 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
33. Id. at 154-55, 577 P.2d at 674-75, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539-40.
34. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
35. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719 (1976);
Coffman v. Kennedy, 74 Cal. App. 3d 28, 141 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1977); Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd
Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972).
36. See cases cited note 35 supra.
37. "For the year 1976, alcohol was described as the primary collision factor in 28.3 percent
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